strategies do not survive the realities of contact with the enemy. How do strategic leaders deal with this? What is their role in implementing the strategy and when do they face the inevitable and adapt their original strategy?
A vital component of the United States' strategy at the outbreak of World War II was a bombing offensive against Germany. It was assumed that unescorted but heavily armed bombers could find their way to specific industrial targets, and could bomb these with great accuracy. However, in 1943 this strategy was proven to be untenable. With rapid adaptations not only to its strategy but also within its operational and tactical domains, the Eighth Air Force overcame the problems, managed to continue its daylight campaign and achieved success. This paper will look at the leadership displayed at the strategic level by Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker during the vital first eighteen months of combat operations. It will examine the agility and adaptability of Eaker and his organization as they gained experience and will focus on Eaker's prime areas of interest: leadership, public relations and the availability of resources.
IMPLEMENTING NEW STRATEGY IN COMBAT:
IRA C. EAKER 1942 It is now generally accepted that the efforts of the U.S. Eighth Army Air Force contributed in important ways to the victory over Germany in World War II. In particular the Eighth Air Force helped to achieve air superiority over Europe, enabling the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944, and opened Germany to devastating air attacks that ultimately crippled its ability to move industrial materials and to fight a war of maneuver.
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The Eighth Air Force entered the European theatre in 1942 with a strategy that assumed unescorted but heavily-armed bombers could find their way to specific industrial targets, and could bomb these with great accuracy. However, in 1943 this strategy was proven to be untenable. With rapid adaptations not only to its strategy but also within its operational and tactical domains, the Eighth Air Force overcame the problems, managed to continue its daylight campaign and achieved success. This paper will look at the leadership displayed at the strategic level by Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker during the vital first eighteen months of combat operations. It will examine the agility and adaptability of Eaker and his organization as they gained experience, and it will focus on Eaker's prime areas of interest: leadership, public relations and the availability of resources. Eaker was now about to wage a whole new type of warfare based on a body of largely untested assumptions.
The overall aerial strategy was set out in AWPD-1, which contained timing and targeting and details on production, manpower, organization, support and basing. 4 With the strategic objective "to defeat Germany (and her Allies)" the task of the Army Air
Force was "to destroy the industrial war making capacity of Germany, restrict Axis air operations and to permit and support a final invasion of Germany." In all, 154 targets had to be destroyed, which would disrupt Germany's electric power supply and transportation system and destroy its synthetic petroleum, aluminum and magnesium production and airplane assembly plants. A total of 6,834 bombers were required "in a six month period that weather conditions favored operations over Europe." It was all based on the theory that U.S. bombers would be able to reach their targets in daylight without prohibitive losses. Fighter aircraft received a low production priority in AWPD-1 and were relegated to the role of "limited area defense and to defend bombardment bases." 5 The American strategy met British skepticism. In 1939, the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) had attempted daylight bombing, but was soon confronted with prohibitive losses and reverted to bombing at night. But night bombing meant reduced accuracy.
Thus the R.A.F. area bombing strategy was born. It was the fervent wish of the British, and especially Prime Minister Winston Churchill, that the Americans now joined in that effort. But the Americans were fully committed to their own strategy and they declined. Bombing results, also, often fell short of expectations. Besides the obvious problems with the European weather, evasive action to flak and fighters and the individual sighting operation by each bombardier were the main reasons. After considerable discussion it was decided to significantly adapt operational procedures including utilization of a new "staggered" formation; elimination of evasive action on the bomb run, and simultaneous bomb release on a signal from a single lead bombardier. In addition, the first tests with "blind bombing techniques" were performed, inspired by the performance of the R.A.F. It was a major threat to the "precision" aspect of the U.S.
daylight bombing campaign, but was forced by the need to maintain a reasonable operational tempo despite the frequent cloud cover over Europe.
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Perhaps the greatest threat to the concept of daylight bombing, however, was the diversion of units to other theatres. Arnold wrote to Eaker in late December: "We have a tremendous job ahead of us but I think that everything is rounding out in such a way that we will be able to put it across." 17 …. Our second recourse is to have our fighters accompany our bombers all the way to the target and back again. We have the 78 th Fighter Group, which, by the 15 th of this month will have its 80 P-38's…… The P-38 is a much better airplane than has been generally presumed, and I feel quite certain that 50 or 60 of these fighters riding above our bombers will do much to prevent the combined and concentrated attacks which heretofore have been made on our bombers over the submarine bases when no friendly fighters were present. I believe that the very presence of these American fighters will reduce our bomber losses by more than 50 %. 19 This somewhat hidden passage in the letter was significant; it underlined that the fundamental trust that the leaders of the Eighth Air Force had in the concept of the unescorted bomber was now slowly eroding. Almost tacitly the "escort fighter" was introduced as a necessary means to be able to reach the strategic objective: the German industry.
1943: the Year of Truth
Eaker was invited to participate in the Allied conference in Casablanca in January 1943. Here he was instrumental in quelling the doubts that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill still had about the U.S. daylight bombing campaign and in getting his plan for a "Combined Bomber Offensive" accepted. The plan basically confirmed that the Allies 'agreed to disagree' on whether bombing by night or by day was the most feasible. It was fully in the spirit of AWPD-1, but now clearly acknowledged that a ground invasion in Europe was required. The plan was formally presented on April 13, 1943. 20 Notably, it stressed that "if the growth of the German fighter strength is not arrested quickly, it may become literally impossible to carry out the destruction planned and thus to create the conditions necessary for the ultimate decisive action by our combined forces on the continent." 21 Eaker was thus convinced that arresting German fighter expansion had to be his first priority.
Eaker's high spirits after Casablanca were bolstered by the first U.S. mission to Germany on January 27, 1943. Fifty-eight B-17s dropped their loads on the submarinebuilding facilities at Vegesack, undisturbed by the Luftwaffe. Although only 'fair' bombing results were obtained, the symbolic value was enormous and raised the morale of the air crews. At the same time, the attrition to the North African theatre continued and had severe repercussions. Eaker wrote to Arnold on January 30 that "it was a terrible blow to lose the P-38's, the 78 th Group would have been going with our bombers by the 1 st of February. That decision is going to mean the loss of many bombers and their fine crews." 22 Only two weeks later, Eaker, who had just learned that he had lost another two B-17 replacement Groups to the North African theatre, had to write to Arnold that "we have not, during the last three weeks, been able to show a continuity of operations."
The weather was the predominant factor now and Eaker compared his force with the R.A.F. "Another reason why we do not have the R.A.F. versatility is because we cannot bomb at night. We expect to be able to do night bombing when the weather is better at night in the near future." In the same letter he referred to the P-47, "we estimate that the …. The fact that this Group was prepared for these attacks, particularly in the Low Squadron which had four aircraft with twin nose guns and yet lost three aircraft from that squadron, indicate that if these attacks continue either the lead group must have a large percentage of nose guns or preferably that we must have fighter support throughout the mission. These attacks will definitely have some effect on the morale of the leading group.
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The demand for fighters at the tactical level was obvious and combat crew morale was one of the gravest concerns that Eaker had to handle. Writing to Major
General Davenport Johnson in the U.S. on April 21, he set out his views on leadership:
I cannot tell you too strongly or urgently, the importance of the group commander in this battle. Invariably good group commanders have good groups, and mediocre group commanders have mediocre groups. There is no exception. I hope I can impress upon you the great urgency of supreme care in picking group commanders. I make this point so strongly because I, myself, did not realize how important it was. I knew it was important, but I did not know it was all important. We have had to relieve several group commanders and we are going to relieve others.
Eaker then summed up the desired and required qualities of a good group commander:
Personal integrity, courage and tough fibre; an ability to inspire the will to fight in his squadron leaders and combat crews; his freedom from discouragement, an officer who does not lose his smile and his even good temper in times of great stress; one who never shows any evidence of indecision, fright or excessive worry; physical fitness; a cooperative personality, one who will carry out orders willingly and promptly. 25 Eaker, realizing that he was setting a high standard, then added "you can clearly see between the available aircraft and crew and those who were actually flying missions. 28 Arnold followed it five days later with another pointed critique:
All reports I have received have admitted that your maintenance over there is not satisfactory and yet you have not taken any steps to recommend removal of those responsible, nor have you attempted to put in men who can do the job. If your maintenance is unsatisfactory now with only a small number of airplanes, what will it be when you have much larger numbers? ..... I am willing to do anything possible to build up your forces but you must play your part. My wire was sent to you to toughen up -to can these fellows who cannot produce -to put in youngsters who can carry the ball…. This is a long letter but I am writing it because I want you to come out of this as a real commander. You have performed an excellent job but there are times when you will have to be tough -so be tough when it is necessary and pass out the bouquets when they should be passed out. 29 Eaker stood his ground; he defended his Eighth Air Force Air Service
Commander who was responsible for the maintenance that was so severely criticized by Arnold: "Miller has shown much more energy, much greater attention to duty and a better appreciation of the task during the last month than he has at any earlier time. His personal habits and his relation toward me and the job have been exemplary." 30 And on August 23 he noted "our combat crews know that they are in a tough fight against a determined, losing and sometimes fanatical enemy, but due to the excellence of their aircraft and their fine training they can overcome him. My problem is to keep their leadership sound and I work unceasingly at that." The continuous pressure on his available resources continued, and Eaker was forced to write to Arnold again and plead for the retention of his medium Bomb Groups.
He had already (albeit temporarily) lost his three B-24 Groups to the Ninth Air Force. 34 On July 18th he reemphasized the necessity of destroying what he deemed "the principal means he [Germany] has for stopping our bombers, namely his fighter force".
He asked Arnold to personally consider the advisability of destroying two specific targets according to a plan he had sent back with General Haywood Hansell to
Washington "as nothing that we can do is as important as destroying German aviation.
It will be absolutely impossible to execute a successful invasion next year unless we break up the German air force." 35 He also stressed the importance of getting his B-24
Groups back shortly. Unfortunately for Eaker, his advice was ignored. On August 1 a major attack on the oil refineries in Ploesti was launched; Eaker would get his three badly-mauled Groups back in late August, only to have them dispatched again to NorthAfrica to help out in the Italian campaign for several weeks. and stated that "the opposition that has been developing through these raids has been going very fast and has reached a greater intensity than last year. However, it now seems to be tapering off that level. So far, we think we have enough equipment, enough tactics, and enough procedure to penetrate that opposition without excessive losses." 37 In view of things that would come in just over a week, it was a remarkable case of wishful thinking. Questioned if the apparent heavier armament of German fighters was to be met by greater caliber guns on the B-17's or by building accompanying fighters,
Hansell replied: "I think the desirability of answers is, fighters first, guns second." And then he added, "there was never any question in the mind of any combat crew member here but that he would like to have accompanying fighters. Nobody was standing on his pride and saying that we could get along without them, because it meant all the difference in the world: when the fighters were along, the mission was going to be relatively easy. When they weren't along, it was tough." were lost, and many more were damaged. 39 Bombing results were quite good, especially at Regensburg, which somewhat eased the message about the losses to the American public.
By this time, Arnold realized that he "had been receiving reports, letters and telegrams from overseas, and verbal accounts from returning officers that made it apparent that I was getting out of touch with the Eighth Air Force". 40 Therefore, he travelled to England and visited both staffs and operational units. While he was there a disastrous mission to Stuttgart was flown on September 6, with the loss of 45 B-17s.
The losses were due less to enemy fighters than to weather conditions, human error and fuel shortage. 41 Obviously feeling that the matter was so urgent he could not wait until his return to Washington, Arnold sent a cable to General Marshall: "Operations over Germany conducted here during the past several weeks indicate definitely that we must provide long range fighters to accompany daylight bombardment missions." 42 Apparently Arnold's eyes were opened by his visits to the operational units because he sent another cable to Marshall, stressing "the necessity of sending the 200 B-17s as planned as the earliest practical moment has been brought out by my visit here…. The total number of B-17s in the Eighth Air Force is less than the total number in the month of July and not sufficient to maintain operations of past strength." 43 Arnold's visit paid off: he had seen with his own eyes that the original strategy was in great peril and that fighters were vital to any success of the Eighth Air Force.
After three days of very intensive operations with significant losses on October 8, 9 and 10, another strike to Schweinfurt was made on October 14. Again, an epic air battle was fought, in which the Eighth Air Force lost another 60 B-17s. This literally ended belief in the idea that unescorted heavily armed bomber should be able to bomb targets in daylight "without prohibitive losses". The next day Eaker was obviously shaken when he wrote his proposed doctrinal answers to Arnold:
This does not represent disaster; it does indicate that the air battle has reached its climax. Our answers to this challenge follow:
1. More fighter cover at longer range.
2. Multiple attacks by 7 or 8 Combat Wings of 54 bombers each on different targets widely dispersed, forcing dispersion of enemy defenses.
3. Greater emphasis on counter Air Force operations, striking all fields with mediums and pressing destruction of aircraft factories and repair establishments with heavies.
4. Bomb through the clouds when his fighters will often be fogbound…. This has great possibility as tests and preliminary operations definitely disclose.
Here is what you can do to help:
1. Rush replacement aircraft and crews. We have thus far this month received 143 planes and 143 crews; we must have minimum of 250 planes and crews this month. We shall loose at least 200 this month and we must grow bigger, not smaller.
2. Send every possible fighter here as soon as possible. Especially emphasize earliest arrival of additional P-38's and Mustangs.
3. Give us 5,000 100 gallon and 3,000 150 gallon auxiliary droppable tanks for fighters as soon as possible and continue at that rate monthly.
We must show the enemy we can replace our losses; he knows he cannot replace his. We must continue the battle with unrelenting fury. This we shall do. There is no discouragement here. We are convinced that when the totals are struck yesterday's losses will be far outweighed by the value of the enemy material destroyed. 44 In his reply Arnold kept up a determined attitude, "We must not only show them that we intend to replace our losses but will send our bombers into Germany with an ever increasing strength; that with our numbers and determination there is nothing the Germans can do which will stop our daylight bombing; that we will change our ideas, our technique, our equipment just as often as is necessary to secure the maximum effort from the airplanes we have available." 45 It is interesting to note that both Eaker and Arnold were now explicitly talking about "replacing losses and numbers"; it had now become an "aerial battle of attrition", as well as a battle of willpower.
Both available fighter types (P-38 and P-47) had range limitations, even with the requested additional fuel tanks. Fortunately, development and production of the P-51
had progressed in recent years in the United States, mainly due to demand by the R.A.F. 46 After several major modifications, including a new Rolls Royce engine and an additional fuel tank, it was ordered in large numbers by the USAAF as well; it soon proved to be the answer that Eaker and his bomber crews desperately were looking for.
On December 7, 1943 the first P-51 Group flew an escort mission, and in early 1944 many Fighter Groups entered combat and tipped the balance. In April 1944 they were tasked to not only escort the bombers at altitude, but were free to find their opponents, either in the air or on the ground. This would prove disastrous for the Luftwaffe. 47 Now encountered everywhere over their own territory, these aerial battles did great damage to the Luftwaffe. Soon, it no longer posed a substantial and constant threat to Allied operations. This enabled the invasion in Normandy and the European campaign afterwards. 48 Eaker was not there to enjoy this success, however. In late 1943 the command structure of the Allied Forces changed significantly. Despite his almost emotional pleas to be retained, 49 Eaker became Commander-in-Chief
Mediterranean Air Forces. 50 Eaker's legacy of leadership
Eaker had led the Eighth Air Force through very difficult times. Arriving in England, convinced of the "unarmed bomber' strategy", he had to manage the multitude of problems that his organization faced early in its campaign. On the strategic level,
Eaker still guided policy making and strategy, even while he was stationed in England.
The plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive was his brainchild and he skillfully ….Strategic leaders guide the achievement of their organizational vision …. by directing policy and strategy, building consensus, acquiring and allocating resources, influencing organizational culture, and shaping complex and ambiguous external environments. They lead by example to build effective organizations, grow the next generation of leaders, energize subordinates, seek opportunities …. and balance personal and professional demands. 51 Eaker fit this profile well; he possessed many apparently timeless strategic leadership traits.
Eaker spent a lot of time keeping up his communications with his own leadership 9 AWPD-42, Copy 11 (Spaatz) in Spaatz papers, Box I:66, Library of Congress. On the original cover note to the Chief of Staff, the required number of fighter aircraft was not even mentioned. It was later added in pencil. On the strategy it mentions that "the air offensive against Germany is a combined effort by the U.S. Army Air Force and the R.A.F. The former will concentrate its efforts upon the systematic destruction of selected vital elements of the German military and industrial machine through precision bombing in daylight. The R.A.F. will concentrate upon mass air attacks of industrial areas at night, to break down morale." 13 LeMay to Major General Robert Olds in a letter of January 12, 1943, quoted in Thomas Coffey, Iron Eagle (Crown, New York, 1986),18. Olds was one of the 'bomber boys' from the pre-war Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field and was held in high regard by all other key players at that time. Health problems kept him from getting a combat command, and he passed away on April 28, 1943 . LeMay also alluded to the problems his navigators were having: "At home, a railroad, town, or river is a checkpoint. Here, the landscape is one jumbled mass of railroads, roads and towns and once you lose track of your position, it is almost impossible to find yourself again". And on the gunnery he remarked: "On our arrival here our gunners were very poorly trained. Most of them had not received enough shooting, especially at altitude, to even familiarize themselves with their equipment. We have over here a tow ship and one range for the Wing, but due to weather and missions, the only practice we have had so far is shooting at FW-190s and Me-109s." 
